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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Payne appeals from the district court's Judgment. Suspended Sentence, 
Order of Probation and Commitment. He asserts that the district court erred when it 
prohibited Mr. Payne from presenting his defense that he did not have the requisite 
intent to possess methamphetamine, because he only had control of the 
methamphetamine long enough to turn it into police. Mr. Payne has a constitutional 
right to present his defense including a right to testify regarding his intent. The 
erroneous exclusion of this evidence violated Mr. Payne's due process rights and, as 
such, his conviction must be vacated. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's incorrect assertions that 
Mr. Payne "contends that he was entitled to explain his motivations regardless of their 
relevance," that he contends for the first time on appeal that he has an affirmative 
defense, and that because neither of the arguments were presented, they fail to meet 
the fundamental error standard. Mr. Payne asserts that the issue presented on appeal 
was squarely addressed by the district court. As such, the doctrine of fundamental error 
does not apply. Further, he asserts that, in this specific case, as in the cases used to 
support his claim, his intent was a relevant issue. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Payne's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it failed to provide Mr. Payne a fair opportunity to present 
his complete defense? 
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A. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide Mr. Payne A Fair Opportunity To 
Present His Complete Defense 
Fundamental Error Does Not Apply 
The State has asserted that "Mr. Payne has shown no fundamental error in the 
exclusion of evidence of his motive for possessing methamphetamine." (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.5-13.) Mr. Payne agrees that he did not argue that the error in his case 
amounted to fundamental error. However, he did not do so because the issue was 
specifically addressed by the district court. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Duvalt, 131 
Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (citing Sandpoint Convalescent Servs. Inc. v. Idaho Oep't of 
Health & Welfare, 114 Idaho 281, 2841 (1988)). An exception to this rule, however, has 
been applied when the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court. Id. (citing 
Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 356-57 (1990)). 
On the first day of trial, following jury selection, the State submitted an oral 
motion in limine asking that Mr. Payne not be allowed to testify regarding "why he 
possessed the alleged methamphetamine and what he was planning to do with the 
methamphetamine," because such testimony was irrelevant. (Tr., p.77, L.7 - p.78, 
L.11.) Mr. Payne stated that his defense was going to be that he did possess 
methamphetamine, but for a limited time and only to turn it in to law enforcement so that 
it could be properly disposed of. (Tr., p.80, Ls.2-6.) The district court agreed that it 
would hear additional argument at a later time if Mr. Payne did decide to testify. 
(Tr., p.81, Ls.9-14.) At the start of the second day of trial, the State again brought up its 
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motion to keep Mr. Payne from testifying about his intent. (Tr., p.84, L.5 - p.91, L.6.) 
After some limited additional discussion, the district court again ruled that it would not 
rule on the issue in advance. (Tr., p.84, L.5 - p.91, L.17.) 
Prior to the defense presenting its case, the State again renewed its motion 
arguing the defendant's proffered testimony would be irrelevant. (Tr., p.180, Ls.12-17.) 
The State argued that there was no defense of necessity, duress, entrapment, mistake 
of law, or mistake of fact. (Tr., p.180, L.22 p.181, L.1.) Defense counsel then argued 
that the State had presented testimony of three individuals that had possessed the 
methamphetamine for legal purposes, that the State of Idaho has laws on point that 
allow for citizens to help enforce the laws of Idaho. (Tr., p.181, L.22 - p.182, L.1.) The 
district court then noted that if Mr. Payne was planning on arguing that since others (law 
enforcement) had possessed it, the jury should not convict Mr. Payne, that it would not 
allow it because it was not proper argument or testimony. (Tr., p.182, Ls.9-19.) 
Defense counsel then argued that, 
if there's an exception that is in the hornbooks that is considered to be 
regular use exception for law enforcement officers and lab analysts to 
have this, then, if a citizen believes he is acting to help enforce the law, he 
should be able to present that to the jury and have them review that. 
(Tr., p.183, L.22 - p.184, L.2.) The district court then stated that, "if that is your 
defense, you're going to have to convince a higher court than this one that it's a proper 
defense." (Tr., p.184, Ls.3-5.) The State asked for a clarification of the ruling asking 
whether or not the defendant could testify to motives. (Tr., p.192, Ls.15-17.) The 
district court stated that, "There's a difference between testifying as to what went on and 
as to his motives. I guess I'll have to listen as the case proceeds, but my inclination is 
to say that motive typically is not a defense to possession." (Tr., p.192, Ls.18-22.) 
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On appeal, Mr. Payne has raised issues related to the district court's order 
limiting Mr. Payne's presentation of his defense: that he indented to possess the 
methamphetamine only long enough to turn it over to police and that he believed he 
was acting on behalf of the police. Therefore, his motive or intent was relevant as it 
negated his actual guilt of the crime charged. 
Further, although he acknowledges that defense counsel never specified that he 
was asserting a specific defense under I.C. § 18-201 (3), the assertions made by 
defense counsel are the same as those that would be required to assert this specific 
defense. Mr. Payne is not required to utter the magic words to have his claim preserved 
for appeal. Because one can understand the basics of his asserted defense without the 
specific annotation to the relevant code section, Mr. Payne asserts that this issue is 
preserved for appeal. 
Therefore, issues related to the presentation of Mr. Payne's defense and intent 
were at issue in front of the district court and are preserved for direct appeal. As such, it 
is unnecessary to prove fundamental error. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide Mr. Payne A Fair Opportunity 
To Present His Complete Defense 
The State asserts that Mr. Payne has argued that motive is always a defense. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.6.) Mr. Payne has made no such general overreaching 
assertion. Simply, he has argued that in this, the case at hand, his intent was relevant. 
The State has gone out of its way to suggest that because Mr. Payne has not 
mentioned the legal standards for proving the charged possession that somehow that is 
"telling" of a deficiency in his appellate case. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) However, 
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Mr. Payne has not, on appeal or at the trial level, ever attempted to argue that he did 
not possess the methamphetamine and, as such, the legal standards for possession 
provide little insight to the issues at hand. Admitting the actual commission of a crime is 
essential to showing that an individual had a defense to their actions. If Mr. Payne had 
not blatantly admitted that he had possessed the methamphetamine, then his intent or 
motive for doing so would not be relevant. 
The State recognizes that Mr. Payne admitted to possessing the 
methamphetamine, notes that Mr. Payne's intention to deliver the methamphetamine to 
police does not disprove his actual or constructive possession, and then concludes that 
because intent evidence does not rebut actual or constructive possession there is no 
constitutional right to present the evidence. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) What is lacking 
from this is a basic understanding of the presentation of a defense to charged conduct. 
One can think of hundreds of examples where a defendant admits to criminal conduct, 
yet offers a defense that does not rebut the occurrence of criminal behavior, but 
negates criminal culpability. Most of these examples rely on an individual's intent in 
committing the offense: battery but with self-defense; theft but with a mistaken belief 
that the individual owned the property; and so on. Under the State's theory, intent could 
never be relevant; an idea just as absurd as if Mr. Payne had argued that intent was 
always relevant in every case regardless of circumstance. 
Mr. Payne argued that based upon the specific facts of this case, his intent was 
relevant and provided information necessary for his defense: that he was turning the 
methamphetamine into police; that he believed he was acting on their behalf; and that 
he only possessed the methamphetamine long enough to complete this act. The State 
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has taken the time to address each of the cases Mr. Payne supplied in support of his 
assertion that motive or intent can be relevant and that it can be error for the district 
court to limit or exclude intent testimony. 1 (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) It is true, as 
the State asserts, that when taken at their most literal meaning the cases establish: 
that evidence of why an employee wrote out a check on his employer's 
account is relevant to whether the employee had intent to embezzle; 
evidence of whether a banker orally clarified a false report was relevant to 
whether he intended to deceive with the false report; and evidence of 
whether a rancher corralling sheep had intent to deprive the sheep from 
their owner is relevant to grand larceny. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) However, these cases also clearly stand for the proposition 
that whenever motive or intent of the accused is relevant to an issue in the case, the 
trial court must allow for the presentation of such evidence. See generally State v. 
Jones, 25 Idaho 587 (1914), State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253 (1915), and State v. Hopple, 
83 Idaho 55 (1960). Contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Payne does not argue that 
there is a "free-standing defense of proper motive" (Respondent's Brief, p.8), but argues 
that motive or intent can be and, in this case, is relevant. 
In this case, Mr. Payne's intent was relevant as to his asserted defense. From 
the very beginning of trial, Mr. Payne noted that his defense was going to be that he did 
possess metharnphetamine, but for a limited time and only to turn it in to law 
enforcement so that it could be properly disposed of. (Tr., p.80, Ls.2-6.) Later, defense 
counsel argued that "if a citizen believes he is acting to help enforce the law, he should 
be able to present that to the jury and have them review that." (Tr., p.183, L.22 - p.184, 
L.2.) As such, Mr. Payne's defense was that he was acting on behalf of law 
1 Specifically, these cases are State v. Jones, 25 Idaho 587 (1914), State v. Givens, 28 
Idaho 253 (1915), and State v. Hopple, 83 Idaho 55 (1960). 
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enforcement by turning the methamphetamine over to police as quickly as possible. 
Under LC. § 18-201 (3), Mr. Payne was not a person capable of committing a crime as 
he committed the act of possessing methamphetamine through the misfortune of having 
the substance thrown to him, although he did not want it. He did not have any "evil 
design" and did not intend to possess it under any traditional theory, but instead had 
only the intent to dispose of it and remove it from his presence in what he believed was 
a legal way. Testimony about intent or motive is crucial to the presentation of this 
defense. 
Mr. Payne requests that this Court carefully consider the issue presented in this 
case. Under the State's position there is no way for a citizen to turn in illegal 
substances to the police. If their intent in conducting limited possession on behalf of law 
enforcement is not relevant to a possession charge defense, no individual can, in any 
circumstance, no matter how noble, possess an illegal substance without a well-
founded fear of felony prosecution and, for that matter, a sure conviction. Following the 
State's logic, if any citizen discovers illegal substances, they are better off leaving them 
alongside the road for a child to find and ingest, than collecting them and turning them 
into police. This issue is of too great of importance to leave up to prosecutorial 
discretion alone. In this case, intent or motive is relevant when offered as a defense. 
As such, the district court interfered with Mr. Payne's right to due process by 
denying him the ability to present his defense, including testimony about his intent. 
Accordingly, Mr. Payne's conviction must be vacated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Payne respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and 
remanded his case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 25th day of May, 2012. 
ELIZABET~~-;N~ ALL~-;; ( 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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